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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MILDRED D. DUBOIS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

F. RAY DUBOIS, JR.,
Defendant-AppeUant.

Case No.
12820

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to dissolve a marriage that was consummated December 13, 1942, and for a determination
and an equitable allocation of the marital estate with alimony and incidental relief by way of attorney's fees and
costs of suit.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After three days of trial the lower court by its Memorandum Decision (R. 16-18) directed a decree of divorce
in favor of respondent with alimony in the monthly
amount of $375.00, attorney's fees of $10,000.00 and a partition of the marital estate of the then fair current value
of approximately $570,000.00 on the basis of 40 per cent
to appellant and 60 per cent to respondent.
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The marital estate consisted of real and personal
property, some in joint tenancy, some in co-tenancy and
other portions in the individual names of the parties. The
Memorandum Decision dated August 4, 1971, while delineating certain guidelines, admonished counsel for both
parties and solicited their sound discretion and stipulation
so that federal mid state income tax and other considerations and consequences might be worked out to the maximum possible benefit or batr:. J.PlJc:lla..11t an<l respondent.
FuI1ctioning within the perimeter of the Memorandum Decision Richard I-I. Stahle, Esq., of counsel for
appellant and Gregory VI. Aggeler, C.P.A., of Touche
Ross & Co. for respondent, both being recognized by the
parties as being knowledgeable in the field of income tax
law, consulted each with the other and arrived at a division of specific items all as reflected in the findings of fact
and conclusions of law (R. 34-42) which findings were
adopted by the trial court on January 10, 1972, and carried forward into the decree of divorce entered the same
day (R. 43-49). The adjustments as made showed a total
gross dolla:.· estate of $578,407.00 as of May 31, 1971, with
items of a given dollar amount of $347,044.00 allocated to
respondent and items of a given dollar amount of $231,363.00 allocated to appellant (R. 29-33).
The matter of the settlement of findings based upon
the allocation as set forth above was by motion (R. 26)
which motion came on before the court for hearing on
January 10, 1972, at which time, in the absence of specific
objections with regard to the various items as the same
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were allocated between the parties (R. 71-77), the findings \V8re settled and the decree was entered from which
appdlant now appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts does not do justice to
the record and in some respects is at variance with the
same. The item of $581,911.00 that is mentioned several
times in appellant's brief and particularly on page 3 is
opposed to the item of $570,000.00, which latter figure was
used by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision of
August 4, 1971, as being the approximate fair current
market value of the estate. The $581,000.00 plus figure is
an accounting problem and appellant is in no position to
assert the same, which figure he states as being taken
from pages 5-6 of the findings of fact (R. 38-39). There
are no totals shO\vn on those pages but there is an explanation by way of "notes" (R. 30) which is a part of the
analysis and evaluation as presented to counsel in connection with the motion fixing time to settle the findings
of fact and conclusions of law and for the entry of the
decree, which proposed findings are likewise attached to
the motion (R. 26-49) .
Paragraph 4 of the motion (R. 27) states that the
various documents, which included the proposed findings,
conclusions and decree, and the analysis and evaluation,
the latter being the result of communications between
Gregory vV. Aggeler for respondent and Richard H. Stahle,
Esq., for appellant, were supplied to counsel for appellant
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m lieu of a proposed stipulation contemplated by the
Memorandum Decision (R. 16-18) so as to give the appellant an opportunity to make such objections at the time
fixed to settle the findings, if any he may have, to the
documents as so prepared (R. 27). At the hearing on
January 10, 1972, there were no objections to the segregation of assets and the valuations given to the same (R.
71-77). The many repeated statements of this court are
to the effect that matters not raised li1 the lower court
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Appellant's statement of the facts gives the court no
information with regard to the events leading up to the
divorce proceedings and undue emphasis is placed upon
the death of respondent's uncle, Dr. Charles E. Hirth,
who in his lifetime was a most generous benefactor by
way of gifts to the parties jointly and individually. Emphasis, by way of a factual statement, is placed upon the
speculative and conjectural benefit to respondent as a
potential recipient of an estate from her aged mother who
is now living in a nursing home. The trial court excluded
the inheritance from Dr. Hirth as a part of the marital
estate. No reference was made in the findings to the expectancy following the death, as and when it occurs, of
respondent's mother.
Appellant who was 50 years of age at the time of trial
and respondent who was 51 at said time were, as appellant points out, married on December 13, 1942, in San
Antonio, Texas. There are two adult children as the issue
of the marriage, one a son and one a daughter, both of

whom are mari·icd, and there are grandchildren. But
there is mo;·c by \Vay of factual statement that appellant
ooit:0 and that we are impelled to add.
('r;. ,January 25, 1970, respondent was made aware of
the fact that her husband was in love with another woman
(R. 51). To that time the marriage was a definite exception to the expression that there is never any wholly guilty
or v1holly innocent party to a divorce action. Appellant
had the unquestioned affection and confidence of respondent, respondent's mother and other members of respondent's family. Respondent's mother thought that "there
was no man in the world as great as Ray Dubois" and
respondent expressed herself "I didn't think there was
anyone like him either". Dr. Hirth "absolutely adored
him" (R. 130-131). There is nothing in the record to indicate any disloyalty on respondent's part and their relationship until the revelation made by appellant, was one
of the utmost trust and confidence on respondent's side
(R. 129-130) .

While in San Francisco with her husband on January
25, 1970, respondent overheard a telephone conversation
between her husband and Marjorie Parry, his first cousin.
A.t the end of the telephone conversation appellant used
terms of endearment toward his cousin and then when he
became aware that his wife had overheard his side of the
conversation, he said "I am in love with another woman"
and when asked how long the affair had been going on
"he said for months" (R. 131-134). Between the incident
in January and the filing of the complaint on the 23rd

day of June, 1970, (R. 1) there were efforts to get the
matter "reconciled" (R. 134).
The parties were members of two country clubs, Willmv Creek in Salt Lake and Pauma Valley in California,
both being avid golf players. In the last 20 years of their
marriage they have taken many trips, stayed at the finest
hotels, enjoyed all of the comforts of what might be described as leisure living, played golf at the most select
country clubs wherever they happened to be, were socially
prominent in Salt Lake and charter members of Willow
Creek since its beginning. They lived in the Mt. Olympus
area in a home reasonably valued at $50,000.00 (R. 136137). Appellant was president of the Utah Golf Association and respondent described their social activities as
being "country club people" having spent the last 10
years in the golfing world and a great deal of time and
money in the country club both in Salt Lake and in Pawna
Valley (R. 138).
Appellant voluntarily terminated his employment
with Lees Carpets as of September 30, 1970, and immediately left Salt Lake to live in San Diego (R. 144) where
Mrs. Parry was residing (R. 9). Appellant's salltry at the
time of his termination was $22,000.00 a year and at the
time of trial, the latter part of July, 1971, he was unem·
ployed as a matter of his own choosing. His lack of em·
ployment was in no way, expressly or by implication, attributed by him as a reason for his not paying alimony w
the respondent. Appellant conceded that there was no
physical or mental condition inhibiting him from the work
that he was accustomed to doing and that he was think·
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ing about getting a broker's license in California and perhaps developing the Pauma Valley property (R. 215).
With respect to the Pauma Valley property respondent was asked the question and made the answer as follows:

"Q. Haven't you stated to Mrs. Parry's boys in
effect that the Pauma Valley area was most attractive to you, and that both you and their mother
were going to build their home there?" (Dep. page
76, lines 14-16).

"9. Answer: I recall having stated to Mrs. Parry's boys that the Pauma Valley area was most
attractive to me. I do not recall having stated to
Mrs. Parry's boys that I or their mother had plans
to build any home there, although such a possibility is an attractive one for me and has been for a
number of years" (R. 11).
During the interim between the termination of the
employment with Lees Carpets and the trial of the case
in July of 1971 appellant expended capital assets in order
to meet obligations that had accrued since leaving his
employment with no compensating job employment from
that point on (R. 230). The expenditure of capital is one
of the variables in connection with accounting matters.
Appellant by his answer (R. 4) admitted that substantial gifts from respondent's side of the family had
been made to the parties over the years. Exhibits 2-P
and 3-P account for the various gross dollars attributable
to gifts, the investment and reinvestment of the same and
the imbalance created by appellant in his favor in the in-
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vestment of various securities. As of May 31, 1971, a
surri..mary of the total estate as shown by the exhibits is
indicated at $588,581.00 with assets in the name of respondent valued at $119,764.00, assets in the name of appellant valued in the amount of $203,982.00 and in the
joint names of the parties, assets valued at $264,835.00
(R. 107-108). There was a single item of $14,225.00 that
appellant received in 1957 from respondent's mother concerning which he had no present memory (R. 220) but
which at the time of his deposition he "vaguely" recollected (R. 229). The transmittal of a letter to respondent's mother by appellant mentioning the sum of $14,225.00 was corroborated by the witness Stansfield as having been seen in appellant's file sometime during the
month of August, 1970, (R. 234). The frugality of both
parties to conserve and accumulate an estate is an admitted fact (R. 222) and Exhibit 1-P kept in the hand
of appellant is replete with factual information with regard to gifts as well as the plan of early retierment (age
55) by 1975 with a total gross estate of $750,000.00. This
item is found in Exhibit 1-P on a page titled Total Assets
of "Mil & Ray," nine pages forward from the last page of
Exhibit 1-P.
Appellant at the end of his statement of facts calls
attention to the fact that during the period of the marriage he contributed "in excess of $500,000.00 in earned
income to the marital estate." Whether this amount is
before or after tax is not indicated, but in any event, it
averages out at $17,241.00 per year for a marriage of 29
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years. We submit that it would be impossible for appellant on that salary to rear his family, live on the social
and economic level of the parties and end up with an
estate of in excess of $570,000.00 but for the contributions
by way of gifts admittedly from plaintiff's side of the
family.
The following, by way of argument, is in the same
order and is intended to controvert the points raised by
appellant.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EXCLUSION OF RESPONDENT'S INTEREST IN THE ESTATE OF HER UNCLE
AND HER EXPECTANCY, IF ANY, OF AN
INHERITANCE FROM HER MOTHER WHO
IS STILL LIVING WAS NOT AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS ACTION ON
THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT.
The trial court was aware of the death of Dr. Hirth
during the month of May, 1970, following the disclosure
of appellant's relationship with Mrs. Parry and approximately a month prior to the filing of the complaint. It is
not clear from appellant's brief whether he claims some
allocation of that interest or whether the contention is
that there should be a disclosure and an affirmative showing that the trial court acted with the discretion afforded
it in such matters. As to the latter, the court expressly by
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its findings of fact awarded to respondent the interest devis12d and bequeated to her by her uncle.

MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P. 2d
1056 (19Gl), cited by appellant, is a case that has been
commented on many times by this court. There is nothing
in the case that supports appellant's contention and in
fact it is authority in support of the conclusion arrived
at in the instant action by the trial court both as to the
estate of Dr. Hirth and the expectancy, if any, from respondent's mother.
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
for such orders in relation to the property "as may be
equitable." There is no question but what Dr. Hirth made
substantial gifts both in the way of property and cash to
respond~mt and appellant during his lifetime. The Illinois
farm lands, the property near Vernal and many substantial cash contributions came from him and were utilized
by the parties in building up the large estate that the
trial court had under consideration (R. 126-131) . The
equities of the situation including the conduct of appellant justify the discretion exercised by the trial court.
MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra, has been repeatedly
cited by this court in connection with the proposition that
a divorce judgment will not be disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the finding of the trial
court, or there has been a plain abuse of discretion, or
where a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought. We
submit that the judgment in the instant matter cannot

1
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be equated with any circumstance that the holding in
MacDonald v. AfacDonald would condemn.

The facts in the MacDonald case are of a sordid nature and as have many times been stated each case must ·
1°2st on its own factual premise, there being no "rule of
thumb" in the application of the equitable principles involved. Mrs. MacDonald was the defendant and filed a
cross complaint for divorce. The trial court entered a
judgment for the husband and the wife appealed. This
court held that the evidence supported the finding that
the wife had been guilty of habitual drunkenness for a period of at least four years and affirmed the judgment of the
lower court. Regardless of the defendant's condition which
the court observed as being in most instances a manifestation of some mental or nervous illness or maladjustment to
the problems of life where excessive drinking is often
sought as an escape from the realities of existence, all of
the physical assets of the property with the exception of
the 1949 Hudson automobile were awarded to the defendant and the plaintiff was ordered to pay alimony in the
sum of $10.00 per year. The trial court was quoted as
stating:
"Such assets are sufficient to care for defendant
* * * and should keep her in such fashion that
she will not become a charge upon public authorities. Should defendant's financial condition become so that she is in danger of becoming a public
charge, the duty of support should fall upon the
plaintiff and not upon the public authorities * * *."
Among the assets awarded to the defendant wife in

12
tne MacDonald case was a bank account of a little more
than $6,900.00 in defendant's name which was the balance
of an inheritance of $8,000.00 which she had received in
1950. It was also stated that defendant had an expectancy in the estate of her mother who was 82 years of age
at the time of the trial. The case contains the oft repeated
statement as follows:
"The problem of attempting to do justice to parties in a divorce action as to the division of property and the awarding of alimony is undoubtedly
one of the most perplexing situations ever to confront a court. The longer the period of marriage,
the greater the difficulties. It would be a wise
judge indeed who could accurately apportion the
weight of all the factors and arrive at the one correct solution, if there be such. The problem is of
such a nature as not to be susceptible of solution
by any exact formula; indeed the authorities frequently say that for that reason each case must
be determined upon its own facts."
The opinion then cites from Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah
255, 67 P. 2d 265 (1937), from which was expressed a gen·
eral formula in the attempt to get the factors in perspec·
tivc all of which may not be present or important in every
case, but which was applied to the evidence in the case
then before it. The factors thus stated are: (1) the so·
cial position and standard of living of each before mar·
riage, (2) the respective age of the parties, (3) what each
may have given up for the marriage, (4) what money or
property each brought into the marriage, (5) the physical
and mental health of the parties, (6) the relative ability,
training and education of the parties.
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"The following points (7 to 15 inclusive) relate
to conditions to be appraised at the time of the
divorce, giving some attention to comparison with
points 1 to 6 inclusive: "
(7) the time of duration of the marriage, (8) the present
income of the parties and the property acquired during
the marriage and owned either jointly or by each now,
(9) how it was acquired and the efforts of each in doing
so, (10) children reared, their present ages, and obligati'.::ms to them or help which may in some instances be expected, ( 11) the present mental and physical health of
the parties, (12) the present age and life expectancy of
the parties, ( 13) the happiness and pleasure, or lack of
it, experienced during marriage, (14) any extraordinary
sacrifice, devotion or care which may have been given to
the spouse or others, such as mother, father, etc., and
obligations to other dependents having a secondary right
to support, (15) the present standards of living and needs
of each including the cost of living.
There is nothing in the foregoing that supports appellant's contention that the vested inheritance in the estate
of Dr. Hirth be included in the "marital estate" if by that
it is meant faat appellant should participate directly or
indirectly in the inheritance. Unlike the MacDonald case
the inheritance came after the breakup of the marriage,
but there is a similarity in that the bank account of something in excess of $6,000.00 in Mrs. MacDonald's name,
identified as the balance of an inheritance, was allocated
to her intact. All of the material assets including the
home and the household furniture with the exception of
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the 1049 Hudson automobile were awarded to the defendant \VUC.
The expression that Mrs. MacDonald "has an expectancy in the estate of her mother who was 82 years of
age at th:3 time of the trial" was not equated with either
a property allocation or alimony, but the court expressly
stated that Mrs. MacDonald "should not be required to
look to her mother for supp0rt, but the definite expectEmcy in her 82 year old mother's estate is something which
may 'Iell be kept in mind a:s a future contingency."
Nothing else was said about the expectancy, in fact
the conno~::..tion v1ith respect to the m,vard of the nominal
sum of $10.00 _:Jer year as alimoay ignores the possibility,
the court stating:
"In making the decree awarding defendant only
the nominal sum of $10 per year alimony, which
was based on the then circumstances, Judge Van
Cott expressly recited that it was for the purpose
of preserving her right to alimony and directed
that if danger of dependence appeared, the burden
of her support would fall upon plaintiff and not
upon others." (Emphasis added.)

1

Appellant cites Michelsen v. Michelsen, 14 U. 2d 328,
383 P. 2d 932 (1963), as being in accord. In the Michelsen case it was stated that the plaintiff wife had an interest in the estate of her deceased father which was valued
at approximately $19,600.00 and the assertion was made ,
that the trial judge failed to take into consideration the
inheritance, it being a conceded fact that no mention was
made of the item in the findings. This court held, how-
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ever, that it was apparent that the trial judge did consider it "for it is discussed in his second Memorandum
Decision". Alimony in the amount of $275.00 a month was
awarded to the wife and she was awarded the equity in
the home situ.:o_ted on a 31h acre tract of land in the Holladay area upon which the trial court placed a valuation of
$30,G'.J,).OG which wc_s apparently offset by awarding to the
haslxmd certain shares of stock which the court found to
have a value of $20,000.00. The court in affirming the
d:::c' cc 0i the trial court concluded:
"The plaintiff is 57 years of age and was, at the
time of the hearing, unemployed. True, she will
receive considerable benefit :md help from her inheritance. However, v;e cannot say that the lower
court's determination was manifestly unjust, inequitable, or an abuse of discretion warranting this
court to substitute its judgment therefor."
Appellant cites Woolley v. Woolley, 113 Utah 391,
195 P. 2d 743 ( 1948) . We fail to find any reference to an
inheritance vested or otherwise in this case. The court
remanded the case to the lower court with directions to
modify the decree for the reason that part of the funds
jointly accumulated had been reinvested in speculative
interests which may at some later date greatly increase
the worth of the defendant husband. The court stated:
"If the money vested in the mining ventures has
been earned by the efforts of defendant in his profession, the efforts of the wife and mother in taking care of the home and children have assisted defendant in its accumulation. Accordingly, she
should not be denied her share of any increase in
value that may result in the future."
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"The effect of the decree as granted by th 2
court below appears to have been to award the
plaintiff a cash settlement in lieu of all alimony.
It is doubtful that the court intended to retain
jurisdiction of the matter for further proceedings
in the event defendant realized on his mining investment. This should be done. * * * The
specific awards as ordered by the court will be
permitted to stand except that the sums paid shall
not be in lieu of all alimony."
The Woolley case contains the often repeated statement to the effect that the decree of the trial court in
divorce proceedings relating to alimony and division of
property will not be modified except when the trial court
has abused its discretion and cites Allen v. Allen, 109
Utah 99, 165 P. 2d 872 (1946), to that effect.
In the instant action the trial court was fully aware
of the death of Dr. Hirth, of the extensive gifts made by
him to the parties during his lifetime, his affection and
confidence in the solidity of the marriage relationship and
then by considered judgment excluded appellant from
participation, directly or indirectly, in the inheritance of
some $75,000.00 which vested after the breakup of the
marriage. We submit that under all of the authorities
this was not an abuse of discretion and appellant cannot
properly complain on that score. Appellant by his brief
leaves the reader in considerable doubt as to how the
inheritance could be considered "by the court in adjusting
the rights of the parties in that estate".
As to the contention that under the law of this state
contingent future interests must be considered by the trial

1

1

1

17

court in adjusting the parties' rights in the marital estate
as directed to respondent's expectancy in her mother's
est:r:e is of startling consequence. We challenge the statement as made and submit that this court in MacDonald
v. MacDonald, supra, has declared just the opposite. If
an expectancy in the estate of a living relative must be
considered by the trial court, the door of discovery is
opened onto a vista of endless consequences.
Section 30-3-11.1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a
legislative declaration of public policy of preserving marriages and promoting the public welfare by preserving
and protecting the institution of matrimony. Just plain
greed could thwart the whole business if the expectancy
of inheritance from relatives now living could be exploited.
The consequence of a discovery deposition directed to the
monied father-in-law, mother-in-law, spinster aunt, uncle,
or even a more distant relative, could balloon the whole
discord of the marital relationship out of any semblance
of perspective.
At this point it should be noted that Exhibit 15-D
projecting appellant's assets including an item of $95,000.00 attributable to the estate of his father and mother,
Exhibit 16-B projecting respondent's assets including an
estimate of Dr. Hirth's estate and the expectancy of her
mother's estate (Mrs. Derry) and Exhibits 17-D entitled
Final Analysis, but projecting inheritances and expectancies from the immedate family of both of the parties were
not received into evidence and presumably not before the
court for consideration.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT E X PRE SSL Y REJECTED THE SO-CALLED ''TRUST' '
THEORY AS THE BASIS OF ITS DIVISION
OF THE MARITAL ESTATE.

Appellant mistakenly argues under his Point II that
the trial court divided the marital estate on the theory
that appellant was a trustee and that gifts from respondent's family constituted the corpus of what might be
termed a trust estate held by appellant for the benefit '
of the respondent. The trial court expressly rejected this 1
theory in the presence of all trial counsel after argument
and before the Memorandum Decision. This will not be
denied.
There was a complete disclosure of the property held
by the parties, how the same was acquired, the efforts of
each in doing so and basically the other factors as set forth
and enumerated in MacDonald v. MacDonald, supra, and
Pinion v. Pinion, supra. The equities of the situation are
clearly evident and include the fact that respondent committed all property as received by her to her husband for 1
investment and reinvestment to afford their standard of
living (R. 129-130), and their mutual enjoyment and exclusive country clubs with golf and travel as their pastime
(R. 136-138) and the endpoint of early retirement (age
55) on a principal accumulation of more than $750,000.00. '
Even a ~ interest in a portion of the Illinois farm
property that respondent inherited before marriage was
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later put in joint tenancy with her husband (R. 212-213).
All cash that came to respondent from her family was deliven::d to appellant without question (R. 191, 217). Appellant stated the he never wanted respondent to suffer,
to be without or to have to work again in her life (R.
2m).
Exhibit 1-P, the record book kept by appellant in his
own handwriting, at the page heretofore referred to, states
the goal to be accomplished in the following words:
Goal 1966 $500,000.00
Goal 1970 $600,000.00
Goal 1975 Net Worth

Goal 1975 $750,000.00

Born 1920 - Retire Age 55
The affair with Marjorie Parry existed for a considerable length of time unbeknovvn to respondent. Appellant
maintained a joint safety deposit box with Mrs. Parry in
San Diego which he declined to reveal until he was furnished with evidence of a writing that such a joint safety
deposit box existed (R. 198-200). The witness was shown
Exhibit 5-P and recognized his handwriting on the document addressed to Mrs. Parry stating "pay (the attorney)
if you have to. We have plenty in our safety deposit box
in San Diego." Mrs. Parry's divorce was in July, 1970,
(R. 184). He maintained a joint safety deposit box with
Mrs. Parry in the Continental Bank in Salt Lake City (R.
187).

Furthermore, appellant no longer wished to remain
married to respondent but "I have always wanted, and
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still do want, the plaintiff to be happy and to have all of
her wishes and needs reasonably satisfied" (R. 11). There
is ample evidence in the record to justify the findings of
the trial court that in light of the direct gifts and inheritances from plaintiff's side of the family, the accumulation
of the parties during the marriage, including the investments and reinvestments of the gifts and inheritances and
other assets "it is fair and equitable that the ::i.ccumulations of the parties be divided, so far as can reasonably be
done, on a basis of 60 per cent to the plaintiff and 40 per
cent to the defendant" (R. 37) .
The allocation of the property was not on the theory
that the gifts be isolated from the so-called marital estate
but to the contrary, the same were treated as a part of
the marital estate which estate the court divided on a
basis deemed to be fair and equitable.

1

Anderson v. Anderson, 18 U. 2d 286, 422 P. 2d 192 1
(1967), is cited by the appellant as being a case that considered the so-called "trust" theory and "flatly rejected
it". The Anderson case again emphasized that no firm
rule can be uniformly applied in all divorce cases, that
each must be determined upon the basis of the immediate '
fact situation and that the trial judge has considerable
latitude of discretion in such matters "and that his judg·
ment should not be changed lightly, and in fact, not at
all, unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity ,
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." The court men·
tioned the wide swing of the pendulum by commenting
on Wilson v. Wilson, 5 U. 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (1956),
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where the court awarded substantially all of the property
possessed by the parties which was in excess of $20,000.00
to the wife a...'1d approximately $500.00 to the husband.
In the Anderson case last mentioned there was a debt
load in excess of $71,000.00 and a net worth of approximately $10,000.00. Bankruptcy was apparently inevitable
unless the home was sold and the debts paid. The "novel"
doctrine was that at the trial it was urged that the wife
have 12 of the net assets clear of the debts. The decree,
on the contrary, ordered the accumulated property sold
to pay the debts and the net assets remaining, if any, to
be distributed 1/3 to the plaintiff and 2/3 to the defendant. In addition, the plaintiff was awarded $200.00 per
month as alimony and $900.00 attorneys' fees. Not only
the property but also the debts were attributable largely
to the defendant husband and the factual premise was
entirely distinct and different from the instant case. One
difference was the fact that both parties had grounds for
a divorce. In Anderson the court, however, reiterated its
previous holdings so far as the responsibility of the court
is concerned.
"This court has stated that '[t]he court's responsibility is to endeavor to provide a just and equitable
adjustment of their economic resources so that the
parties can reconstruct their lives on a happy and
useful basis. In doing so it is necessary for the
court to consider, in addition to the relative guilt
or innocence of the parties, an appraisal of all of
the attendant facts and circumstances: the duration of the marriage; the ages of the parties; their
social positions and standards of living; their
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health; considerations relative to children; the
money and property they possess and how it was
acquired; their capabilities and training and their
present and potential incomes.' "
POINT III.
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS A PROPER EXERCISE OF DISCRETION BY THE
TRIAL COURT.
Appellant argues in part that the expectancy in re1
spondent's mother's estate, the inheritance that she will
receive from Dr. Hirth, all coupled with the award of the 1
marital estate, should offset her need of $750.00 per month
by way of alimony and this in anticipation of income from
other sources after the divorce (R. 146). Respondent's
testimony in that regard was not challenged although in
the brief appellant characterizes the testimony as "her
own self-serving statement". It will be recalled that ap- '
pellant voluntarily terminated his employment and that
by not working he did not want it understood that respondent was not entitled to alimony on that account.
It will also be recalled that he did not want his wife to
ever work or to suffer financially in any respect.
Alimony is a matter of discretion based upon variable
circumstances. In the instant case there was no deter·
mination of income as distinguished from capital sufficient
to permit respondent to enjoy the same standard of living
to which she was accustomed while married to appellant.
There are, however, certain assets that are income pro·

1
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ducing such as the Illinois farm property, paying a little
over $4,000.00 per year and certain of the securities in
publicly owned corporations, the dividend income from
which is not disclosed. Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah
9, 12 P. 2d 364 (1932), and Allen v. Allen, supra, are cited
by counsel and are consistent with the discretion exercised by the trial court, the court having obviously taken
into consideration the income that respondent can reasonably anticipate from other sources when the award was
in the amount of $375.00 rather than $750.00 per month
as requested by respondent. MacDonald v. MacDonald,
sup£a, expressly refers to the fact that it is the husband's
obligation to support the wife even though in that case
the wifo was at fault, the court stating that she should not
be required to look to others in that regard, making specific reference to an expectancy from her aged mother's
estate &s and when she died.
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 14 U. 2d 24, 376 P. 2d 547
(1963), there was substantial property awarded to the
wife and likewise $1,250.00 per month as alimony. The
court stated:

"It is apparent from the court's distribution of the

property that the husband was left with the wherewithall to continue producing a substantial sum of
money and also substantial interests in real and
personal property were allowed to be retained by
him, so that it does not appear he will be greatly
hindered in the mode of living to which he has
accustomed himself. The wife has been given some
income producing property, as well as alimony, so
that she can continue living in the style to which
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she has become accustomed during the marTiage.
Under such circumstances, this court cannot say
that there has bsen a plain abuse of discretion or
that the awards are unjust and inequitable. Unless there is manifest injustice and inequity or a
clear abuse of discretion, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court."

POINT IV.
THE AWARD OF ATIORNEYS' FEES IS
CONSISTENT WITH CASES OF THIS KIND.
Appellant does not question the amount of the requested attorneys' fee which was the subject of proof
(R. 236-237) and which is outlined in Exhibit 12-P. The
Utah cases cited by appellant, namely, Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504, 229 P. 2d 681 (1951) and Weiss v.
Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P. 2d 1005 (1947), are not in
point and do not support the contention that attorneys'
fees to a wife must be based upon need and a showing that
she has no separate estate from which to pay the same.
In the Alldredge case the husband brought the action
and was awarded the divorce. The wife was the one at
fault and her counterclaim was dismissed. The trial court
denied the wife alimony and attorneys' fees and this court
while affirming the decree of divorce remanded the case
for the purpose of awarding the defendant counsel fees
and determining the amount of alimony, regardless of the
fact that she had been found guilty of misconduct resulting in a divorce against her.

1
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In the Weiss case the husband's action for divorce
was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. As to attorneys'
fees, the court stated:

"The statute does not contemplate that awards
for expenses of suit or for temporary alimony
should be made only in those cases where the
'adverse party' (usually the wife) is destitute or
practically so. It contemplates such awards when
in the sound discretion of the court the circumstances of the parties are such that in fairness to
the wife she should be given financial assistance
by her husband in her prosecution or defense of
the divorce action, and for her support during its
pendency."
In Stuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 244 P. 2d 650
(1952) , the court sets forth the above quoted portion from
the Weiss case and then concludes:
"The rights of the wife to attorneys' fees when she
is forced to go to court to enforce a divorce decree
should not be different from those of one who seeks
temporary alimony. The court did not err in granting attorneys' fees to respondent."
In Gardner v. Gardner, 118 Utah 496, 222 P. 2d 1055
(1950), attorneys' fees were awarded the wife with the
statement that "Evidence as to what would constitute a
reasonable attorneys' fee was not a prerequisite to an
award thereof when the case was contested and foe court
awarded only a modest fee." Butler v. Butler, 23 U. 2d
259, 461 P. 2d 727 (1969), could be said to be an exception to the statement just made to the extent that there
must be evidence to sustain a finding in support of an
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o~·der avmrd~ng

attorneys' fees to the plaintiff wife.

In Sorensen v. Sorensen, supra, this court sustained
a substantial 8.ttarneys' fee although the plaintiff wife
was awarded property and alimony of consequence. In
the instant action appellant would have this court announce a rule that is contrary to precedent and to the '
everyday practice of trial courts throughout the state in ,
th2 award of attorneys' fees to the wife irrespective of her
fin:mcial necessity and of her own ability to pay such fees.

POINT V.
THE DECREE WAS NOT PREMISED UPON
A VINDICTIVE OR PUNITIVE PREMISE.
No one ever "wins" in a divorce action. The background history of the parties to the instant action spells
a tragedy and yet, human nature being what it is, the
falling out of love is not a rarity. Seldom, however, do
people go "first class" when the parting of the ways occurs
at the ages and after the accumulations as found in the
instant case and with retirement at the age of 55 with
material assets of % of a million dollars the mutual goal
of the parties. It is undoubtedly the respondent who feels
that she has come out on the short end, the fortune having been acquired through gifts from her side of the family, the husband not only having betrayed the wife but
also the donors. Be that as it may, Wilson v. Wilson,
supra, cited by appellant under this point, states that as
a practical matter the court invariably does consider the
relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties to their mar-
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riage vows and the relative guilt or innocence in causing
the breakup of the marriage.
The trial court was sensitive to the expression used
i11 Wilson v. Wilson, supra, to the effect that there was
no authority in our law for administering punitive measures when after hearing the testimony with regard to
the telephone conversation on January 25, 1970, between
appellant and Mrs. Parry and the final separation of the
parties, he interrupted by asking respondent if the matters to which she had testified caused her extreme mental
anguish to which she answ<)red affirmatively, then said
the "grounds are complete" (R. 134).
Appellant's voluntary retirement from Lees Carpets
on September 30, 1970, his association with Mrs. Parry,
his offer to contribute t.o the expense of her divorce, the
fact of the joint safety deposit box with Mrs. PaITy both
in Salt Lal~e and in San Diego, his rapport with Mrs.
Parry's sons both by way of trips outside of the United
States and with regard to projected plans for Pauma Valley, coupled with his expenditure of capital assets rather
than to secure a job after a demonstrated earning capacity
of some $22,000.00 a year were matters that went to
credibility, including the accounting of the marital estate.
In the Wilson case which was tried before Judge
Wahlquist in Davis County, the husband asked plaintiff
to secure a divorce for the reason that he was in love with
another woman and wanted to marry her. Notwithstanding the fact that the divorce was indispensable to his plans
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he desired to be released from the bonds of matrimony at
the least possible economic disadvantage to himself. The
trial court awarded the wife all of the property possessed
by the pmiies except for $500.00 as indicated and then required the defendant by way of an award of property, to
pay the cash sum of $5,000.00 payable $50.00 a month.
The only change that this court made was to reduce the
$5,000.00 payment to $2,400.00 payable $50.00 per month .
or until the plaintiff's remarriage, whichever event occurred first in point of time. In so doing the court, nevertheless, made the following observation:
"The more recent pronouncements of this court,
and the policy to which we adhere, are to the effect '
that the trial judge has considerable latitude of
discretion in such matters and that his judgment
should not be changed lightly, and in fact, not at
all, unless it works such a manifest injustice or
inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion."

CONCLUSION
Appellant was represented by extremely competent
counsel. The case was contested at every level to the ex·
tent of even denying the grounds of divorce. The record
discloses a patient, tolerant and understanding attitude
on the part of the trial court toward both parties. There
was no semblance of a punitive nature. But as in Wilson
v. Wilson, appellant obviousily desired to be relieved from
the bonds of matrimony at the least possible economic
disadvantage to himself. Why he did not engage in some
compensable work activity is only known to himself, but
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he disclaimed his retirement from work at the age of 50
as not meaning to deprive respondent of alimony and he
expressed the desire that she continue to live in the manner to which she had been accustomed and that she never
be required to work.
As the court has expressed, these cases take almost

the wisdom of a Solomon in their equitable solution and
thi::; applies equally to the task of counsel, who on both
sides, or,rer a long period of time, must constantly be alert
to the sensitivities of their respective clients and to the
ultimate outcome which can be rationalized on a fair and
equitable basis.
In the instant matter the rationalization of a fair and
equitable financial consequence in favor of the respondent
is ignored by appellant and he unfairly charges the trial
court with being biased and prejudiced. As in the Wilson
c1~.e the falling in love with another woman with the pressure of dissolving the bonds of matrimony has its own
devastating effect. Here we have grandparents who outwardly lived an extremely happy and constructive life,
but now the attack is on the trial court. This is an irrational act of one suffering from an extreme guilt complex,
unable in the ordinary course of things to accept the full
consequence of his own voluntary whim and act. He
apparently cannot adjust himself to the fact that he has
indulged in one of the most expensive and devastating
"luxuries" of life.
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The decree of the trial court should be sustained with
such affirmative relief by way of costs and attorneys' fees
on appeal as to this court may seem proper.
Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN & GUSTIN
Harley W. Gustin
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondenl

